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Situatedness: The Interplay
between Context(s) and Situation¤
KATHARINA J. ROHLFING¤¤, MATTHIAS REHM¤¤
and KARL ULRICH GOECKE¤¤
ABSTRACT
In order to interpret the behaviour of cognitive systems, the integration into their
speci c cultural environment must be considered. The phenomenon of situatedness is
a crucial determinant of this behaviour. We derive the notion of situatedness from the
interplay between agent, situation, and context (divided into inter- and intracontext).
The main objective of this paper is to connect a theoretical analysis of situatedness
with its implications for empirical research. In particular, we consider processes of situated
learning in natural and arti cial systems.
KEYWORDS
Situated cognition, concept formation, learning, symbol grounding.
1. Motivation
One of the dif culties connected to understanding and modelling natural
systems is based on the fact that they are not isolated from but rather
integrated into context and situation. However, if the goal is to observe
mechanisms and processes of a system, it is methodically essential to detach
the system from the situation it is part of. A growing sensitivity has emerged
in theoretical and empirical research of cognitive science concerning this
phenomenon which has been termed situatedness. It has been employed
by sociologists, anthropologists, cultural psychologists, and conversation
analysts as well as AI and behavioural scientists in describing the close
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relation between an individual and its environment, and the in uence of
this relation on the nature and development of the individual itself.
This paper is motivated by our aim to connect a theoretical analysis
of the role of context(s) and situation with two examples of learning in
arti cial and natural systems. We will point out some aspects of the
interplay between context and situation in order to contribute to the
scienti c exchange regarding situatedness in the  eld of (linguistic) concept
formation. We start by clarifying the notions context and situation involved
in the phenomenon (see Section 2). Then, some theoretical underpinnings
for the application of these notions to acting systems are outlined (see
Section 3). In Sections 4 and 5, we report from two different perspectives
on which impact situatedness has on human cognition or more generally,
processing of information in an acting system. First, an arti cial system is
described that models processes of situated learning (Section 4). Afterwards,
language acquisition in humans is viewed from a situated perspective
(Section 5). Finally, we summarize our analyses and propose a de nition
of the notion situatedness (see Section 6).
2. Context vs. Situation
2.1. Terminology
The terms situation and context are often used synonymously. However,
to derive situatedness from the interaction of situation and context it is
necessary to dissociate these notions.
A situation consists of the spatiotemporal ordering of objects and agents
alongside physically given constraints or characteristics like gravitational
force or light intensity. Of interest to an agent1 are the stimuli that it
can perceive with its sensors. In our view, situatedness refers to speci c
situations in which actions take place. Actions are understood here not
only as task-oriented behaviour but in a broader sense (cf. Clancey 2002).
In contrast to situation, context is a general construct that depends on
1When we talk about agents, we mean not only human agents but also arti cial systems,
following a de nition given by Franklin and Graesser (1996): “An autonomous agent is a
system situated within and a part of an environment that senses that environment and acts
on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the
future.”
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various factors and is de nable on at least two different levels. On the one
hand, there are socio-cultural (global) contexts such as language. On the
other hand, smaller (local) contexts can also be found, e.g., the context of
a seminar. The actions of an individual, from now on called an agent, are
constrained by this context. A student at a seminar has to act according
to her role as a student, i.e. she has to be attentive, ask smart questions,
and discuss the topic of the seminar. Dancing, singing, or swearing is
not expected from her as it is not licensed by the seminar context. In
this sense, a context supplies certain patterns of behaviour and of analysis
for situations an agent can be confronted with. A provision of this kind
is exempli ed in Section 5. A situation is thus embedded in a certain
context. This context in uences or determines a situation and its analysis
by the agent. In a given situation, there is not a single context but a great
number of different, possibly overlapping contexts. In order to analyze
whether something is context sensitive or situated, it is necessary to look at
the speci c situation and  gure out which contexts are present and which
role the agent plays in each of them.
We will now approach context in a more abstract way. For this purpose
we divide it into two different types: intercontext and intracontext. Both of
them are established by agents. Clancey (1993) describes the interactions of
a group of agents as follows: “In a group we are mutually constraining each
other’s perception and sequencing, so our capabilities to interact are both
developed within, and manifestations of, social, multiagent interactions.”
When agents interact with their environment or with one another, they
establish what will here be called an intercontext. Such an intercontext is
not an objective fact, but it consists of a complex network of interacting
subsystems (society, study group, etc.). Semin and Smith (2002) call this
product of agents’ interactions the “socially shared reality.” Thus, an
intercontext is a social phenomenon that cannot be surveyed by a single
agent, rather it hints at how an agent can interact appropriately in a
speci c situation, i.e. the agent’s options for acting. Further it suggests
probable ways of how an agent acts and gives meaning to the situation.
By its interactions in speci c situations in a certain intercontext, an agent
establishes its own intracontext, allowing it to make sense of the situations
it encounters, i.e. to give meaning to them. The intracontext is a partial
mapping from the intercontext.
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Figure 1. Inter- vs. Intracontext. Agents interact with each other and with ob-
jects. These interactions establish the intercontext (left hand side). Simultaneously,
an individual agent builds up an intracontext, which is a partial mapping from
the intercontext (right hand side).
There is a mutual in uence between these two types of context. The
intercontext in uences the intracontext, because the intracontext of an
agent is created in speci c situations where the intercontext as socially
shared reality manifests itself. There is also an in uence the other way
around: the agent makes sense of the speci c situation and acts in it
on the basis of its intracontext. The action itself, in turn, is part of the
intercontext. We will disregard this interdependence here to make the
analysis of contexts and situatedness feasible.
Against the background of the terminology developed here, establishing
an intracontext, i.e. abstracting away from speci c situations, is learning.
A single learning step is situated as it takes place in a speci c situation.
It is in uenced by the intercontext in which the situation is embedded,
supplying certain interpretations and action patterns. The result, i.e. the
abstraction over various (similar) situations, is thus (inter)context sensitive.
The established intracontext is always based on the intercontext encoun-
tered during learning. Using the intracontext in a speci c situation is the
characteristic feature of situatedness.
2.2. Situated Action and Situated Learning
An action is situated because it always takes place in a speci c situation.
The more sophisticated an agent’s intracontext, the more sophisticated
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actions become possible by taking more of the situational setting into
account. An example of an action that is mostly rule-driven and utilises
only a limited fraction of the speci c situation can be found in Franklin
(1995). A certain type of wasp needs a paralysed cricket to feed the wasp
grubs. The wasp brings the cricket to the threshold of the burrow in which
it will lay the eggs, goes inside to check the burrow and then pulls the
cricket in. If the cricket is removed a few centimeters from the threshold
before the wasp reappears, it comes out, brings the cricket to the threshold,
goes inside to check the burrow, etc. This can be repeated over and over
again. The wasp is following a genetic plan, triggered by cues present in
the situation. Actions are selected on the basis of a pre-existing schedule
and these triggers. In this case, no elaborated intracontext is mediating the
action selection process.
Learning, viewed as a process of concept formation, constitutes the
other end of the scale of situated processes. Over time, an agent collects
relevant information from speci c situations and forms concepts. What is a
relevant piece of information in a situation is in uenced by the intercontext,
since the same situation given in different intercontexts provides different
relevant pieces of information for an agent. These concepts constitute the
intracontext of the agent. Sections 4 and 5 discuss this issue in detail.
3. Interaction Mechanisms
In an acting system, two major mechanisms allowing the interaction of the
agent with its environment can be distinguished. They are termed perceptual
and effectorial processes. All mechanisms constituting the sensoric perception
of the environment by the agent (sensoric mechanisms) as well as their
interpretation on a ‘higher,’ deliberative level carried out by cognitive
mechanisms are perceptual. On the other hand, the notion of an effectorial
process comprises all cognitive and motoric subprocesses controlling the
actuators of the agent. In this way, the agent actively exerts an in uence
on the situation.
Situatedness can here be interpreted as follows: the agent interacts
with the situation by perceptual and effectorial processes. The intracon-
text is formed by concepts permanently modi ed by the interaction (see
Sections 4 and 5). This interplay of intracontext, perceptual, and effec-
torial processes on the one hand and the situation on the other hand is
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the characteristic feature of situatedness, which is most obvious in sim-
ple stimulus-response couplings, e.g., re exes. These very basic interaction
mechanisms form one end of a scale denoting a “measure of situated-
ness” of actions. At the other end are actions in which perceptual and
motoric processes play only a secondary role regarding the interaction be-
tween agent and situation. For about two decades, the above mentioned
interaction mechanisms have been the focus of research activities. Two
areas are of special interest here: the discussions concerning the notions of
a) symbol grounding and b) situated action execution. Symbol grounding is
concerned with representational levels, structures, and processes occuring
in and constituting interaction mechanisms. Situated action execution deals
with the question of how far interaction mechanisms can be described by
methods of classical AI (search, planning, knowledge representation using
logic-based formalisms, etc.) or of whether a new paradigm with respect to
agent architectures is needed (cf. Greeno et al. 1993).
3.1. Symbol Grounding
Symbol grounding denotes the issue that, besides its syntactic role within a
system, a symbol has an additional meaning constituted by means of refer-
ence to (parts of) the environment (see Harnad 1990). Thereby, an agent is
not limited to using the symbol as if it were solipsistic. Due to the principle
of compositionality, the agent also knows the meaning of complex sym-
bols derived by mere syntactic manipulation of grounded symbols. With
respect to the aforementioned interaction mechanisms, symbol grounding
has mainly been dealt with from the perceptual perspective. This seems
due to the tradition of AI research where arti cial systems are mostly
conceptioned as ‘recipients of orders’ not supposed to carry out complex
interactions with the situation, i.e. their effectorial tasks are very limited
(e.g. data base systems). However, an agent, not only perceiving the sit-
uation but also acting in it, has to be able to map its intracontextual
symbols onto motoric patterns. We are aware of the controversial debate
about whether agents use symbols (Madole and Oakes 1999; Keijzer 2002).
From our perspective the notion of intracontext comprises both perceptual
and conceptual processes in agents, irrespective of whether symbols play a
role in these processes or not.
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Symbol grounding is crucial for the discussion of the notion of
situatedness if one accepts the hypotheses that a) there exists a regular
relationship between the symbols and the context, and that b) complex
agents possess a level where their behaviour is symbolically expressable and
that this in uences their behaviour in fundamental ways. The interaction
between agent and environment is only possible in an architecture allowing
for the formulation of solutions of the symbol grounding problem. For
an agent, the physical features of a situation (objects, other agents, etc.)
are stimuli generating a subsymbolic representation within the agent
(see Figure 1 (right hand side)). For natural agents (e.g. humans), this is the
activation of neurons in the sense organs. In arti cial agents, it can be, for
example, pixel images, the activation of contact sensors, or the diaphragm
of a microphone. From this sensoric representation, the intracontext is
established (e.g., symbols are derived, Goecke and Milde 1998), possibly
including additional, subsymbolic layers (e.g. neural networks). On the
other hand, the intracontext propagates onto a subsymbolic level, this time
the motoric control level. In this way, the agent affects the situation. It is
still unclear to what extent perceptual and effectorial processes use different
representations (Neumann and Prinz 1990).
3.2. Situated Action Execution
The notion of situated action execution has achieved a wider acknowledge-
ment in the context of the appearance of the behaviour-oriented paradigm
of action control (e.g. Brooks 1991). Earlier ‘classical’ systems have been
designed according to the so-called Sense-Model-Think-Act (SMTA) ar-
chitecture: the perception of the environment leads to the construction or
modi cation of a world model. A planning algorithm computes a sequence
of actions to be performed according to which the control parameters of
the actuators are modi ed (Nilsson 1984). The main problem with this
kind of architecture is the temporal delay of (possibly important) reactions
to changes in the environment due to the necessity for complex symbol
manipulation (deliberation, e.g. inferencing or replanning) before motoric
processes can be started. In the framework of the behaviour-oriented par-
adigm, situated action execution means that the agent does not act on the
basis of a  xed action plan (cf. also Clancey 2002), but (at least additionally)
on the grounds of specialised sensor-effector interconnections allowing for
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fast reactions in a changing environment. No explicit symbolic representa-
tions are needed for this kind of reactive behaviour. Quite to the contrary:
as symbols are generally not used in this kind of action control, they have
to be derived from distributed pieces of information (see previous section)
if they are to serve as a descriptive level of deliberative processes.
Examples of agent architectures designed after these principles com-
prise Brooks’ mobile robots (cf. Brooks 1986) employing the so-called
subsumption architecture, and Steels’ dynamical systems approach (Steels
1993). Typically, these agents do better than SMTA agents with respect
to speed and simplicity of modelling, especially in dynamically changing
environments where no long-term goals have to be pursued.
An attempt to connect the advantages of both control architectures
and thus to compensate for the respective disadvantages are hybrid systems
(Malcolm and Smithers 1990; Milde et al. 1997). Here, reactive pieces of
behaviour are in uenced by control parameters brought about by processes
on the cognitive level. In this way, the intracontext of an agent modi es,
if necessary, the situationally determined action selection. More recent
approaches enhance these types of systems with the possibility to consider
also intercontextual in uences. Dautenhahn et al. (2002) call them socially
situated agents: “A socially situated agent acquires information about the
social, as well as physical domain through its surrounding environment,
and its interactions with the environment may include the physical as well
as social world.” The next section shows an example of an agent using
language as a social in uence.
4. LOCATOR: Modelling Concept Formation in Situated Agents
In the previous sections we have developed the notions of inter- and
intracontext and have discussed how symbol grounding and situated action
execution contribute to a situated agent architecture. On this basis we will
exemplify how an intracontext is established by forming concepts.
Concepts are understood here as bridging the gap between perceptual
experiences and linguistic symbols. Thus they serve two functions. On
the one hand, they ground linguistic symbols in sensorimotor experiences.
On the other hand, they help structuring sensorimotor experiences by
an abstract amodal symbol system. A concept in LOCATOR can be
seen as the organisational unit that binds certain parts of sensorimotor
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Figure 2. LOCATOR: an anthropomorphic agent explores its complex, virtual
environment. For the agent, this situation is constituted of the visual perception
of the scene and the language input, here e.g., The well is right of the fence.
acitivity to linguistic symbols. The literature on concepts is very rich and
diverse (see Margolis and Laurence 1999, for an overview). The notion
of concept as used in LOCATOR can best be described as a dynamic
approach to concepts (see, e.g., Lakoff 1987; Thelen and Smith 1994).
Such an approach denies the objectivist’s perspective on concepts and
propagates instead a subjective process of concept formation, i.e. dependent
on experienced situations and tasks. By this change in perspective the focus
of investigation is shifted from a concept’s content to the process of concept
formation. Stability in the use of concepts thus stems from universal
concept formation mechanisms and a stable environment. This view
corresponds to Glenberg’s ideas on the variability of cognitive structures,
which is limited because of “our common human endowments and our
common environment” (Glenberg 1997). This does not necessarily imply
identical concepts in different agents. What’s dynamic in dynamic concepts
is their ability to remain inherently changeable during the lifetime of an
individual.
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LOCATOR is a simulation system that is well suited to examine aspects
of situated cognition like concept formation.2 Virtual, anthropomorphic
agents move around in a virtual, complex world (see Figure 2). The
agents autonomously explore their environment. They are controlled by
a behaviour-based architecture. Different sensors allow them to receive
two kinds of input during their exploration: vision and language. Concepts
are formed in the speci c situations an agent  nds himself in during this
exploration. Thus the concepts re ect the agent’s history of experience.
Situations vary across agents due to their different exploration histories,
which depend on the agent’s exploration path and on the language input
which is supplied by the human interlocutor.
The domain chosen for LOCATOR are frames of spatial reference as
described by Levison and his colleagues (see e.g. Bowerman and Levinson
2001; Levinson 1996; Senft 1997). The language input describes spatial
relations between the objects the agent encounters. It is given in one of two
languages: either in German (relative frame of reference) or in Marquesan3
(absolute frame of reference). The effects of situated concept formation can
be found on two different levels in LOCATOR:
1) Comparing agents experiencing different languages: Marquesan struc-
tures the spatial domain in a way that is compatible with a kind of
absolute frame of reference. The language input given in German em-
ploys a relative frame of reference. Thus, by comparing the established
concepts, the effects of the different intercontexts can be shown.
2) Comparing agents experiencing the same language: The effects of situ-
ated concept formation lead to concepts that differ in content, although
the agents experienced the same language. Each agent establishes an
individual intracontext.
The language input plays a crucial role in LOCATOR. In conjunction with
the objects and the agent itself it establishes the intercontext of the agent.
The intercontext exerts an in uence on the learning process, especially by
2LOCATOR is based on the system LOCUTOR, which was developed by Jan Torsten
Milde at Bielefeld University (e.g. Milde 2000).
3Marquesan is a polynesian language applying primarily an absolute frame of reference
with a directed axis seaward/landward, and an undirected crossaxis. We are grateful to
Gabriele Cablitz (MPI Nijmegen) for supplying us with the utterances used in LOCATOR
(see Cablitz 2002 for further details).
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Figure 3. The development of the categorisation success rate of two agents over
time. Agent one (left hand side) experienced German language input, agent two
language input from Marquesan.
means of the language input. The language input is a conventionalised
form of the intercontext and thus more than a situated input component.
It represents a generally accepted way how a certain language community
may describe the spatial arrangement of objects in a given situation. During
the learning phase, language is used by the agent as a tool to analyse
situations, e.g., to focus on relevant elements of the scene. On the one
hand, language is functionalised as a selection criterion. On the other
hand, utterances are directly grounded in the sensoric input which is an
additional basis for concept formation. A concept is formed by abstracting
from different situations and an intracontext consists of these concepts.
One important result of LOCATOR is the dependence of concept
formation on speci c situations. The intracontext established by concepts
depends on the experienced situations. On the basis of these experiences,
an abstraction is possible allowing for the categorisation of different
situations as similar.
This needs focusing on features relevant for the categorisation process
and for constituting the basis for the formation process. In different
agents, different features may emerge according to the situations they are
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confronted with. This is in accordance with  ndings of Schyns and Rodet
(1997), who show that the features used by subjects to categorise objects
are created in a situated fashion and depend on the subject’s individual
history of experience with the objects.
Some of the results can be described here (for a more detailed
discussion see Rehm (2001a and 2001b). Figure 3 shows the categorization
success for two agents. Agent 1 on the left hand side was provided with
language input in German. In this experiment only spatial descriptions
employing the relations links (left) and rechts (right) were used. The language
input of agent 2 on the right hand side was given in Marquesan. Here,
the relations ma tai o (seaward) and ma uta o (landward) were used. What
is shown is the success rate of the two agents on a scale from 0 (0%) to
1.0 (100%). Every 160 trials the average success is measured over this time
period. In a single trial, an agent receives – apart from the permanently
available visual input – a spatial description by the human interlocutor.
The agent tries to categorize the input with the already established
concepts. If this does not succeed, concepts are created, modi ed or the
perceptual system is modi ed. Both agents have established concepts that
allow a successful categorization of incoming input, as Figure 3 shows.
During the process of concept formation the agents shape their abilities
to analyse the perceptual input. First, the dimensionality of the three-
dimensional input image is reduced by calculating the center of mass of
each object. Then,  ve perceptual features are calculated by each agent.
Three of them rely on the main axes of human spatial cognition (Howard
1982): the vertical, the 2. sagittal (depth), and the horizontal. The features
calculated are:
1) the angle between the center of mass vectors (COM) of two objects and
the vertical (VERTIKALE);
2) the angle between the COM of two objects and the horizontal (HORI-
ZONTALE);
3) the angle between the COM of two objects and the second sagittal (2.
SAGITTALE);
4) the distance between two objects (ABSTAND);
5) the alignment of two objects in reference to the origin of the coordinate
system (AUSRICHTUNG).
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Figure 4 depicts the perceptual systems of the two agents. The agents
establish discrimination nets for a number of perceptual features. This
technique was  rst introduced by Steels (e.g., Steels 1996). Both agents
have modi ed their systems in a way that allows a successful categorization,
i.e. one that is compatible with all experienced input (vision and language).
Figure 4. Features created by the two agents. Agent one (above): German. Agent
two (below): Marquesan. Different feature detectors were elaborated by the two
different agents. Moreover, suitable anchor points for the calculation of perceptual
features have emerged as can be seen on the left hand side: for agent one obj1000
(the agent itself) is highlighted, for agent two it is obj0 (the mountain top).
A single node of such a discrimination net can serve as a feature of a
concept. The activation of a node thus also leads to some activation in
the associated concepts. Comparing the two agents shows two different
effects the variation of the language input has. The two agents establish
different coordinate systems in which the perceptual features are calculated
(highlighted on the left hand side of Figures 3 and 4). Agent 1 (relative
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frame of reference) uses a coordinate system centred in itself (obj1000).
Agent 2 (absolute frame of reference) calculates the features in a coordinate
system centred in the mountain top (obj0). The other effect can be seen
directly in Figure 4. The agents have modi ed their respective perceptual
system in different ways, focusing on different features to establish spatial
concepts.
With regard to the notions developed in this article, the system LOCA-
TOR exempli es two important aspects. As the nodes of the discrimination
nets serve as building blocks for the established concepts, the content of
these varies accordingly. The features they created and thus the concepts
formed on the basis of these features are affected by the different situations
the agents experienced. Note that the agents were embedded in different
intercontexts. The intracontext is also subject to this variation because it
consists of the concepts formed and thus it is agent-speci c.
5. Situated Learning
In the previous section we claimed that concept formation is the process
of establishing an intracontext. In this section, we apply these considera-
tions to human development. Generally, we follow Vygotsky’s (1987) idea,
who claims that concept formation in humans is not a gradual social-
ization introduced from the outside, but a gradual individualization that
emerges on the foundation of the child’s internal socialization. We focus on
language acquisition and establishment of the meaning of a spatial prepo-
sition, which involves questions about how a representation is grounded.
The following psycholinguistic study exempli es some relevant problems.
In this study, the infants’ understanding of local prepositions in Polish was
tested (Rohl ng 2001).
5.1. The Acquisition of Local Prepositions
The meaning of a local preposition is usually captured by the appropriate
spatial relation (cf. Herweg 1989). Accordingly, the child has to grasp the
abstract or lexical meaning of this relation  rst when acquiring the local
preposition. However, Bowerman and Choi (2001) review studies indicat-
ing that children make use of their intracontextual prelinguistic knowledge
about objects and events. Additionally to their linguistic knowledge, infants
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follow certain strategies of which some will be presented in this section and
discussed from the situated point of view.
The notion of strategy originates from Clark’s (1973) study about
infants’ understanding of spatial relations. She observes that infants pay
attention to the features of objects: if a presented object includes a
horizontal surface, the infants’ behaviour is in uenced insofar as they
will declare it the landmark-object and put something ON its surface.
If the presented object is a container, they will put other objects IN this
landmark. This type of in uenced behaviour dominates over the language
understanding, i.e. infants will put e.g. the pot ON the table even though
they are verbally instructed to put the pot UNDER the table. Sinha (1982)
observes a further strategy. Infants learn a canonical orientation of an
object  rst, i.e. they learn how to place a cup on a table (i.e. in an up-right
position), how to hold a pen, etc. This canonicality constitutes the basis of
infants’ knowledge about objects, their intracontext, and sets up conditions
to recognize the object and to handle it correctly. This non-linguistic
knowledge about objects already contains culture-speci c aspects. How an
object is handled as an artefact is grounded in canonical rules preserved by
the cultural group. Cups, for example, do not occur naturally, but must be
produced. To be a drinking vessel, a cup must be a container, which
possesses a certain structure (Sinha 1983). Canonical rules restrict this
structure and we refer to a cup in its canonical position as a container. The
motivation for canonical rules, however, depends on human interest and
values. In our cultural group, a basket resides in its canonical orientation
when it serves as a container for transporting something with the opening
upright – and not with the opening upside down for catching chicken as
in the Zapotec culture (Sinha and Jensen de López 2000). Canonicality
is grounded in children’s experiences with objects and events and builds
up a child’s expectations about these objects and events. In this sense,
canonicality belongs to the intracontext of a child. However, the strategy
to act according to the canonical rules develops when perceiving situations
which are in uenced by the intercontext, i.e. a child can build up a related
concept when she or he is confronted with it in a certain situation and
identi es the character of an object. Evidence for using the non-linguistic
strategies is provided by the following study with 20-26 months old infants
in which responses to instructions with spatial prepositions were evoked.
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The rationale of the study was to test the involvement of non-linguistic
knowledge and to get insight into its nature (see Rohl ng 2001 for details).
5.2. Experimental Study
The study we refer to follows a certain experimental setting: at the begin-
ning of a task, two objects were presented to every child. Subsequently,
the infants were asked to put the objects together in a relation. Relation is
meant as an alignment between two objects, the trajectory and the land-
mark. The terms originate from Langacker’s approach (1987), according
to which the trajector refers to an active object acting against the back-
ground of another object, the landmark. The alignment speci ed by the
task requires a motion from the trajector to the landmark. Consequently,
solving the problem and achieving a spatial relation in the task, the child
decides:
² which of the objects is the trajector, which is the landmark?
² which relation is appropriate to the objects or which is suggested by
them?
² which motion should be performed to achieve the relation?
In the following, trajector and landmark are designated also as roles of
objects. The role of an object is speci ed by its function in an action. The
action, in turn, is grounded in a situation.
Method and Hypotheses
In this study, infants were requested to bring two objects together in an
ON-relation. Two types of verbal instructions 6 were used for this purpose:
one type consists of a syntactically correct request (1) relating two objects
to each other in view of an ON spatial relation; the other also consists of
a request, but in this case this is syntactically incorrect (2): the preposition
is omitted.
(1) Daj konika NA most! [Put the horse ON the bridge!]
(2) Daj konika most! [Put the horse the bridge!]
Assuming strictly situated problem solving, infants were supposed to per-
form well in both cases without indications of missing the preposition,
because the solution was assumed to emerge from a child’s knowledge of
the objects. Additionally, only objects where the ON-relation was possible
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(e.g. a pot ON a table) were used in the task. For the analysis, the infants’
reactions to the two types of instructions were compared.
Results
24 infants of the age of 20 to 26 months participated in this study. 83
responses were relevant for the scoring. A response was classi ed as non-
relevant when the participant performed the requested relation with a
different toy or did not react to the instruction at all. The scored reactions
show a clear result: there are 41 responses to the instruction without
preposition in which infants performed the ON-relation – as predicted –,
only one child performed another relation. To the syntactically correct
instruction with an ON-preposition, there were 38 responses with an
ON- and three with another relation. The results support the hypothesis
that infants do not need the appropriate preposition to understand an
instruction when the relation requiring a certain situation allows for the
most frequently seen roles of the focussed objects. Infants’ reactions to the
required task show that they are guided by certain strategies additional
to their linguistic knowledge. The qualitative results of the experiment
(see case studies reported in detail in Rohl ng 2002) indicate that this
strategic knowledge is important for infants in the age group studied. They
are anxious to maintain it with the aid of games (in which they imagine
and create already-seen situations) or imitations (in which they test similar
situations). In this sense, the frequency of a recurrent situation plays a role
for correct understanding of language. However, frequency as a factor in
understanding language cannot be seen as a determinant: according to the
results reported in Sinha et al. (1999), frequency can in uence but not
substantially determine the semantic content.
Taken together, the results from the study reported here con rm
the involvement of non-linguistic strategies in understanding instructions.
However, the way how the strategies in uence infants’ behaviour differs
from the way suggested in Clark (1973) or Sinha (1982). In this sense,
the results suggest a more complicated picture about the involvement and
the nature of infants’ non-linguistic knowledge. While both authors use
the term rules to characterize the in uence of non-linguistic strategies, a
case study from the above experiment shall cast doubt on this claim. It
questions whether these strategies determine (in the case of rules) infants’
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behaviour or just in uence it, leaving open the possibility that other factors
contribute to the behaviour.
Marcel (23 months old) received the instruction to “put the cup plate”
and he put the plate ON the cup. The expected reaction, however, was
an inverted one: the cup ON the plate, because the plate has a horizontal
surface (Clark’s rule) and because the child knows that usually things are
put on the plate (canonicality by Sinha). After consultation with his mother
it turned out that she always makes tea that way: she puts the tea in a cup
and then covers it up with a plate to stew. In this situation, both objects
seem to be known to Marcel, whereby the plate received a trajector-role
and was put ON the cup. In this case, the object’s role is deduced from
its “relational character” (cf. Thiel 1985) and in uenced by the coexistence
of another object. Marcel matched both objects to a typical, for him well-
known situation. In that situation, a certain activity (making tea) involves
both objects and ends with a certain relation – to put the plate ON the cup.
Later during the experimental session, Marcel demonstrated that when
other objects were present and he was focussing on either the cup or the
plate, he preferred the canonical positions (the plate to put things ON it
and the cup upright to put things IN it). Thus, one cannot claim in this case
that only physical properties of the objects provoke a certain behaviour of
a child and that the child’s knowledge about objects consists only of their
canonical relations. The child’s response results from the interplay between
her or his intra- and intercontext in a speci c situation.
Discussion
The results show that infants do not need prepositions for following an
instruction if the relation requested in this instruction correlates with the
most-seen role of an object. Beyond it, Marcel’s reaction conveys an idea
of how situated learning of a relation can proceed: the child perceives a
certain situation in which two objects are involved in an activity. From this
performance a child can deduce the individual roles (trajector or landmark)
of involved objects. The typicality of a situation (Rohl ng 2001) therefore
seems to be central to the child’s intracontext: the experience of a situation
provides information, which is substantial for a child building up her or his
knowledge about involved objects. In a further, similar situation the child
associates a known action with these objects and regards their canonical
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Figure 5. Forming an intracontext from an intercontext.
orientation. The child extends her or his knowledge about an object
observing its roles depending on different activities in different situations.
Information from these observations creates a character of an object –
a kind of concept.
This mechanism of creating a meaning is also suggested in Riegler
(2002), when he points out that “[m]eaning arises as a result of relating
a new piece of experience to the existing network of already made
experiences rather than to entities in the world.” On this basis, the child
knows which relations are possible with this certain object (see Figure 5).
To put it in other words, the character of an object consists of the
sum of its functional roles: if a plate functions only as a support (e.g.
for food), the child will know the plate only in this role. In a recurring
situation, seeing a plate, the child activates this role and tries to relate
other objects to it appropriately (e.g., the child will put a toy horse ON
the plate). This intracontextual knowledge dominates the child’s upcoming
action in a situation and bears an important function: the child knows, for
example, what a plate is for. If she or he had already observed other roles
of an object, it depends on a given situation and involvement of further
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objects which role from the objects’ ‘character repertoire’ will be motivated.
When, in turn, a situation is designed to motivate a certain relation – as in
the presented study – it is possible that infants understand an instruction
without a preposition i.e. without marking the spatial relation verbally
as well as an instruction with an appropriate preposition. In this case,
the understanding is supported by the situation: the child’s intracontext
responds to a certain situation, whereby the perception motivates a non-
linguistic strategy. Grounding in an object’s character (i.e., the state of
knowledge about an object), a strategy allocates a certain role to an object.
Marcel’s reaction provides counterevidence to the nature of the mecha-
nisms of non-linguistic knowledge presented in Clark and Sinha. Learning
proceeds in a situated fashion and is not subject to only one rule (e.g.,
canonicality) but to different strategies being applied to speci c situations.
Moreover, the strategies which represent an action originating from the in-
tracontext are established on the basis of a situation and information from
the intercontext.
6. Summary
We have subdivided the notion of context into intra- and intercontext.
An agent’s intracontext is constituted of concepts formed and modi ed
during situated perception-action cycles. The intercontext of a group of
agents emerges from the interplay of the members of this group with
the environment and each other. As a social phenomenon, it restricts
the interactions of an agent in a speci c situation. As we have shown
by our examples, this distiction between an inter- and an intracontext
is essential. Even though other authors do not make it explicit, they
acknowledge that cognition is “distributed, occurring not only within
an individual mind [intracontext] but extended across other people or
elements of the environment [intercontext]” (Semin and Smith 2002).
The dovetailing of an agent’s intracontext and the situation, mediated
by perceptual and effectorial processes, is the essence of situatedness. This
is a much broader sense of situatedness than is usually found, e.g. in
Dautenhahn et al. (2002). When they speak of situatedness, they mean just
acting in a speci c situation. The interplay between inter- and intracontext,
i.e. the strong structural coupling of an agent with its (physical and social)
environment is termed by the authors embeddedness. In contrast to their
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terminology, we propose that many phenomena – like embeddedness or
the interpersonal variation in conceptualisation of a situation (Fischer 2000)
– can be explained by the two different types of context and their interplay.
In AI-oriented cognitive science, situatedness can be found especially
in two  elds: symbol grounding and action selection. At least partially, sym-
bols used intracontextually have to be re ected on correlates in a situation
to be able to acquire meaning. Research questions connected to symbol
grounding are: What kind of representation allows this connection? What
kind of processes lead to such representations? Concerning action selection,
a major issue is how often the perception-action cycle is run through in a
certain time span and to what extent complex intracontextual representa-
tions are necessary for adequate (re-)actions of the agent. Here, the poles
are classical planning and reactive systems, respectively. Changing perspec-
tive from symbol grounding and action selection to the establishment of
an agent’s intracontext emphasises the importance of situatedness. Building
up an intracontext always takes place in a situation and thus always refers
to the situations an agent encounters during its interactions. The inter-
context supplies patterns of analysis, e.g. in the conventionalised form of
language. Therefore, language is more than a situated input component.
The speci c form of the intracontext depends on two things: the situa-
tions encountered during learning and the agent’s intercontext. By means
of the system LOCATOR and the case study of Marcel in comparison to
other children, it was shown how a situated learning process can lead to
differences in the conceptualisations of different agents despite equal suc-
cess in using their concepts. Our main focus is on the process responsible
for establishing concepts and thus the intracontext. On the one hand, this
clari es the in uence of the intracontext on the agent’s interactions and on
the other hand, it emphasises the dynamics of intracontextual change. In
our approaches we focused on situated learning because it is always part
of an interaction, i.e. interaction cannot take place without situated learn-
ing. Three types have to be distinguished: concept formation, modi cation,
and preservation. Concept formation is the process of initially building up
the intracontext on the basis of information from the intercontext given in
speci c situations. Intercontextual change and experience of new situations
have to be accompanied by changes in concepts. As concepts constitute the
intracontext and are responsible for an appropriate action, it is necessary to
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modify them and to keep them updated. As the agent’s intracontext inter-
acts with the environment, every action is a preservation of already existing
concepts; the successful action con rms the character of these concepts.
We summarise: an agent interacts with the situation by perceptual
and effectorial processes. On this basis concepts are formed and perma-
nently modi ed by the interaction. The intracontext is established by the
formed concepts. This interplay of intracontext, perceptual and effector-
ial processes, and the situation is the characteristic feature of situatedness.
Thus, situatedness is the effect of a situation on concept formation (situated
learning) and the concrete manifestation of an action in a situation.
REFERENCES
BOWERMAN, M. AND CHOI, S.
2001 Shaping meanings for language: universal and language-specic in the acquisi-
tion of spatial semantic categories. In M. Bowerman and S.C. Levinson (Eds.),
Language acquisition and conceptual development (pp. 475-511). Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
BOWERMAN, M. AND LEVINSON, S.C. (EDS.)
2001 Language acquisition and conceptual development. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge.
BROOKS, R.A.
1986 A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and
Automation 2, 14-23.
1991 Intelligence without reason. In Proceedings of the 12th International Joint Conference on
Articial Intelligence, Vol. I (pp. 569-595). Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA.
CABLITZ, G.
2002 Marquesan. Unpublished dissertation, University of Kiel.
CLAN CEY, W.J.
1993 Situated action: A neuropsychological interpretation response to Vera and
Simon. Cognitive Science 17, 87-116.
2002 Simulating activities: Relating motives, deliberation, and attentive coordination.
Cognitive Systems Research 3(3), 471-499.
CLAR K, E.V.
1973 Non-linguistic strategies and the acquisition of word meanings. Cognition 3, 161-
182.
DAUTENHAHN , K., OGDEN , B. AND QUICK, T.
2002 From embodied to socially embedded agents – implications for interaction-aware
robots. Cognitive Systems Research 3(3), 397-428.
154 KATHARINA J. ROHLFING, MATTHIAS REHM AND KARL ULRICH GOECKE
FISCHER , K.
2000 What is a situation? In Proceedings of Götalog 2000, 4th Workshop on the Semantics
and Pragmatics of Dialogue. Gothenburg Papers in Computational Linguistics 00-5,
85-92.
FRANKLIN, S. AND GRAESSER , A.
1996 Is it an agent, or just a program? A taxonomy for autonomous agents. In
J.P. Müller, M.J. Woolridge and N.R. Jennings (Eds.), Intelligent Agents III. Agent
Theories, Architectures, and Languages (pp. 21-35). Springer.
FRANKLIN, S.P.
1995 Articial minds. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
GLENBERG, A.M.
1997 What memory is for. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 20(1), 1-55.
GOECKE, K.U. AND MILDE , J.-T.
1998 Situations- und Aktionsbeschreibungen durch einen teilautonomen Montagero-
boter. In Computers, Linguistics, and Phonetics between Language and Speech. Proceedings
of the 4th Conference on Natural Language Processing – KONVENS 98, vol-
ume 1 (pp. 331-335). Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M.
GREENO , J.G., CHI, M.T., CLANC EY, H., W.J. AND ELMAN, J. (EDS. )
1993 Cognitive science special issue, Vol. 17.: Situated action. Ablex, Norwood, NJ.
HAR NAD , S.
1990 The symbol grounding problem. Physica D 42, 335-346.
HERWEG, M.
1989 Ansätze zu einer semantischen Beschreibung topologischer Prapositionen. In C.
Habel, M. Herweg and K. Rehkämper (Eds.), Raumkonzepte in Verstehensprozessen.
Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zu Sprache und Raum (pp. 99-127). Niemeyer, Tübingen.
HOWARD, I.P.
1982 Human visual orientation. John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, New York, Brisbane,
Toronto.
KEIJZER , F.
2002 Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition. Cognitive Systems Research
3(3), 275-288.
LAKOFF, G.
1987 Cognitive models and prototype theory. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and conceptual
development: Ecological and intellectual factors in categorization (pp. 63-100). Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
LANGACKER, R.W.
1987 Foundations of cognitive grammar. Vol. 1: Theoretical prerequisites. Stanford University
Press, Stanford.
LEVINSON , S.C.
1996 Frames of reference and Molyneux’s question: Crosslinguistic evidence. In P.
Bloom, M.A. Peterson and L. Nadel (Eds.), Language and space (pp. 109-169).
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
SITUATEDNESS: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONTEXT(S) AND SITUATION 155
MADOLE , K.L. AND OAKES, L.M.
1999 Making sense of infant categorization: Stable processes and changing represen-
tations. Developmental Review 19, 263-296.
MALCOLM , C. AND SMITHERS, T.
1990 Symbol grounding via a hybrid architecture in an autonomous assembly system.
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 6, 123-144.
MARGOLIS, E. AND LAURENCE, S. (EDS.)
1999 Concepts: core readings. MIT Press, Cambridge.
MILDE , J.-T.
2000 LOKUTOR: Towards a believable communicative agent. In J. Rickel, W.L.
Johnson and J. Lester (Eds.), Achieving human-like behavior in interactive animated
agents. Fourth International Conference on Autonomous Agents, 2000.
MILDE , J.-T., STRIPPGEN, S. AND PETERS, K.
1997 Situated communication with robots. In First international workshop on human-
computer conversation, Bellagio, Italy, July.
NEUMANN , O. AND PRINZ, W. (EDS. )
1990 Relationships between perception and action. Springer.
NILSSO N, N.J.
1984 Shakey the robot. Technical report, SRI International. Technical Note 323, Stanford,
CA.
REHM , M.
2001a Language guiding concept formation in arti cial agents. In Holmer, Svantesson
and Viberg (Eds.), Proceedings of the 18th Scandinavian Conference of Linguistics (pp.
241-253). Travaux de l’Institut de Linguistique de Lund.
2001b LOKATOR – Multimodale Bedeutungskonstitution in situierten Agen-
ten. Bielefeld University, Online publication, URL: http://archiv.ub.uni-
bielefeld.de/disshabi/2001/0073.
RIEGLER , A.
2002 When is a cognitive system embodied. Cognitive Systems Research 3(3), 339-348.
ROHLFING , K.J.
2001 No preposition required. The role of prepositions for the understanding of spatial
relations in language acquisition. In S. Niemeyer, M. Pütz and R. Dirven (Eds.),
Applied cognitive linguistics I: Theory and language acquisition (pp. 229-247). Mouton de
Gruyter, Berlin.
2002 UNDERstanding. How infants acquire the meaning of UNDER and other
spatial relational terms. Bielefeld University, Online publication, URL:
http://archiv.ub.uni-bielefeld.de/disshabi/2002/0026/ index.htm.
SCHYNS, P.G. AND RODET, L.
1997 Categorization creates functional features. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition 23(3), 681-696.
SEMIN , G.R. AND SMITH, E.R.
2002 Interfaces of social psychology with situated and embodied cognition. Cognitive
Systems Research 3(3), 385-396.
156 KATHARINA J. ROHLFING, MATTHIAS REHM AND KARL ULRICH GOECKE
SENFT , G.
1997 Introduction. In G. Senft (Ed.), Referring to space – studies in Austronesian and Papuan
languages (pp. 1-38). Claredon Press, Oxford.
SINHA, C.
1982 Representational development and the structure of action. In G. Butterworth
and P. Light (Eds.), Social Cognition: Studies of the Development of Understanding (pp.
137-162). Harvester Press, Brighton, Sussex.
1983 Background knowledge, presupposition, and canonicality. In T. Seiler and W.
Wannenmacher (Eds.), Concept development and the development of word meaning (pp.
269-296). Springer, Berlin.
SINHA, C., THORSENG , L., HAYASH I, M. AND PLUNKETT, K.
1999 Spatial language acquisition in Danish, English, and Japanese. In P. Broeder
and J. Murre (Eds.), Language and thought in development. Cross Linguistic Studies (pp.
95-125). Gunter Narr, Tübingen.
SINHA, C. AND JENSEN DE LOPEZ, K.
2000 Language, culture and the embodiment of spatial cognition. Cognitive Linguistics
11, 17-41.
STEELS , L.
1993 Building agents out of autonomous behavior systems. In L. Steels and R. Brooks
(Eds.), The ‘articial life’ route to ‘articial intelligence.’ Building situated embodied agents
(pp. 83-121). Lawrence Erlbaum, Ass. New Haven.
1996 Perceptually grounded meaning creation. In M. Tokoro (Ed.), Proceedings of the
International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (pp. 338-344). AAAI Press.
THELEN, E. AND SMITH, L.B.
1994 A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
THIEL, T.
1985 Räumliches Denken und Verständnis von Lokativen beim Spracherwerb. In H.
Schweizer (Ed.), Sprache und Raum (pp. 184-208). Metzler, Stuttgart.
VYGOTSKY, L.S.
1987 Thinking and speech. In The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky, Vol. 1: Problems of
general psychology (pp. 39-285). Plenum Press, New York.
